Topics explored in this series include the history and practice of international law (including sources of international law, Indigenous treaties, international treaty diplomacy, subnational treaty making, domestic reception of international law and Parliament's role in international law), as well as Canada's role in international law, governance and innovation in the broad fields of international economic, environmental and intellectual property law. Topics with an economic law focus include international trade, dispute settlement, international taxation and private international law. Environmental law topics include the international climate change regime and international treaties on chemicals and waste, transboundary water governance and the law of the sea. Intellectual property law topics explore the development of international IP protection and the integration of IP law into the body of international trade law. Finally, the series presents Canadian perspectives on developments in international human rights and humanitarian law, including judicial implementation of these obligations, international labour law, business and human rights, international criminal law, war crimes, and international legal issues related to child soldiers. This series allows a reflection on Canada's role in the community of nations and its potential to advance the progressive development of global rule of law. 
About the International Law Research Program
The International Law Research Program (ILRP) at CIGI is an integrated multidisciplinary research program that provides leading academics, government and private sector legal experts, as well as students from Canada and abroad, with the opportunity to contribute to advancements in international law.
The ILRP strives to be the world's leading international law research program, with recognized impact on how international law is brought to bear on significant global issues. The program's mission is to connect knowledge, policy and practice to build the international law framework -the globalized rule of law -to support international governance of the future. Its founding belief is that better international governance, including a strengthened international law framework, can improve the lives of people everywhere, increase prosperity, ensure global sustainability, address inequality, safeguard human rights and promote a more secure world.
The ILRP focuses on the areas of international law that are most important to global innovation, prosperity and sustainability: international economic law, international intellectual property law and international environmental law. In its research, the ILRP is attentive to the emerging interactions among international and transnational law, Indigenous law and constitutional law. When reviewing the chapter by Bruce McDonald, one is struck by how much the state of international IP law has changed for Canada since 1974. For example, in 1990 Canada became a party to the Patent Cooperation Treaty; it acceded in 1996 to the substantive provisions of the Stockholm Act (1967) of the Paris Convention (whereas previously it was a party to the London Act [1934] and the administrative provisions of the Stockholm Act [1967] ); in 1998 Canada acceded to the Paris Act (1971) of the Berne Convention (whereas previously it was a party to the Rome Act [1928] and the administrative provisions of the Stockholm Act [1967] ). These changes, however, pale in significance with that of the integration of substantive IP rules into international trade agreements, starting with the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization (WTO Agreement). This paper reviews and assesses, from a Canadian perspective, the significance of integrating the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) into the WTO Agreement as well as of integrating comprehensive IP chapters into bilateral and plurilateral free trade agreements (FTAs) and their implications for substantive IP obligations and dispute settlement proceedings.
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The Paris Convention and Berne Convention before the Uruguay Round
Including comprehensive chapters of IP provisions in international trade agreements was still a novelty in the 1990s. Until then, the basic structures of international protection for patents and trademarks were set out in the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property (Paris Convention, of which the original text goes back to 1883); the terms for copyright were set out in the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works (Berne Convention, of which the original text goes back to 1886). In the period before the 1990s, the inclusion of a comprehensive set of IP rules in trade agreements was not even seriously considered.
4 IP and international trade were seen as two separate worlds. In that era, responsibility for international IP rules was considered to lie with the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) 5 and responsibility for global trade rules with the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) (as an organization). The efforts to integrate IP into the body of international trade law in the late 1980s and early 1990s were driven in part by a desire for new IP rules and for more effective enforcement, both domestically and through international dispute settlement. These efforts were led by the United States and were strongly influenced and encouraged by US business interests.
8
While both the Paris Convention and the Berne Convention contain provisions providing for adjudication of disputes between parties to these conventions by the International Court of Justice, subject to the possibility of an opt-out by each of the parties, this mechanism has never been used. In 1984, the GATT Council established a group of experts to look into this question. 17 That group produced its report in 1985. 18 The report recognized that trade in counterfeit goods was a growing problem but was inconclusive as to whether joint action would be appropriate within the GATT framework on the commercial aspects of counterfeiting. The experts were bothered by questions of jurisdiction between GATT and WIPO. The appropriateness of joint 14 The "Quad" or "Quadrilaterals," consisting of Canada, the European Communities (EC), Japan and the United States, were still a significant group during the Uruguay Round negotiations: "Understanding the WTO:
The Organization -Membership, alliances and bureaucracy", online:
<www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org3_e.htm>. 19 The changes brought about by TRIPS in both the substantive rules of the international IP system, and the simultaneous shift of jurisdiction for dispute settlement from WIPO (which operated in practice without binding dispute settlement) to the WTO dispute settlement mechanism, should not be underestimated.
An important obstacle to overcome was the idea that IP agreements were the responsibility of WIPO and that the GATT or WTO should stay away from including comprehensive texts of IP rights in trade agreements. It took time to overcome this mindset. In the Uruguay Round it was the intensive lobbying efforts of US business that pushed the US government to insist on a comprehensive IP agreement.
20 US business also successfully lobbied its European and Japanese counterparts. on enforcement. 22 The successful outcome of the TRIPS negotiations was, at least in part, attributable to the pressure exerted by the United States through Section 301 and, later, Special 301 on other countries.
23 Section 301 and, later, Special 301 provided the Office of the US Trade Representative (USTR) with a (unilateral) mechanism to review other countries' IP laws and their enforcement, and to take retaliatory action, if necessary. Under Special 301, USTR annually produces a report that can place certain countries the United States is concerned about on a watch list or priority watch list. these standards; and a rigorous dispute settlement mechanism to enforce these standards.
25
WIPO did not easily give up on a special dispute settlement system for the adjudication of dispute between states on the interpretation of international IP agreements. During the period of 1990-1996, a WIPO group of experts worked on the Proposed Treaty on the Settlement of Disputes between States in the Field of Intellectual Property. In the fall of 1997, this draft treaty was referred to the WIPO General Assembly (Twenty-First Session, September 22 to October 1, 1997) for further decision making. 26 In accordance with WIPO's normal practice, the next step would have been for the WIPO General Assembly to request the director general of WIPO to convene a diplomatic conference to discuss the text and consider the adoption of the draft treaty. This did not happen.
The outcome is that WIPO has the substantive expertise in IP but it has ceded to the WTO the dispute settlement function regarding IP rules. (Stockholm Act, 1967 ) the minimum standard for all WTO members. TRIPS also added a host of substantive and enforcement obligations, and the overall package had been subjected to the national treatment and most-favoured nation (MFN) obligations of TRIPS. WIPO continues to have a role in developing new substantive rules in specific areas of IP, such as through the elaboration and adoption of the WIPO Internet Treaties. However, the dispute settlement function regarding global IP rules has been taken over by the WTO.
FTAs and "TRIPS plus"
The fact that TRIPS became an integral part of the WTO Agreement (on the same footing as the GATT 1994 and the General Agreement on Trade in Services [GATS] ) and was made subject to WTO dispute settlement was a major breakthrough. Once that bridge was crossed, there was no going back. Both the United States and the EU subsequently embarked on ambitious programs to raise the level of IP protection through including IP chapters in bilateral or plurilateral FTAs.
In this context, it is worth noting that there are basic differences between the status of FTAs in relation to GATT 1994 and GATS as compared to the relationship of such agreements to TRIPS. Both GATT 1994 and GATS permit WTO members to conclude FTAs (or customs unions) in which they grant each other preferential treatment regarding trade in goods and services, in derogation from their normal GATT and GATS obligations. 29 The MFN obligation of TRIPS article 4, without a general exception for FTAs, means that WTO members must make any concessions regarding IP granted in bilateral or plurilateral FTAs immediately available to all other WTO members. This puts IP provisions of FTAs in a different category than provisions on trade in goods and services.
The entry into force of the NAFTA IP chapter (January 1, 1994) preceded the entry into force of the TRIPS Agreement by one year (January 1, 1995). Both texts had their common origin in the Dunkel Draft of the TRIPS Agreement, of December 20, 1991. 30 In practice this has meant for NAFTA parties that compliance with the NAFTA IP chapter, by and large, was the same as compliance with TRIPS and vice versa. Thus, the original NAFTA required little in terms of "TRIPS plus."
Since NAFTA entered into force, Canada had concluded no FTAs that contained a comprehensive chapter on IP until Canada and the European Union signed CETA on October 30, 2016. 31 The CETA IP chapter has brought about significant changes to Canada's IP legislation, in particular on pharmaceutical patents and new geographical indications (GIs) regarding agricultural products and foods. 32 As between Canada and the United States, the TPP, the negotiations on which were initiated by the United States under the Obama administration, is an example of the United States trying to go beyond TRIPS (and NAFTA) with a small group of negotiating partners. All 12 TPP countries signed the TPP text in 2016. This did not bring the TPP into force as a treaty because these signatures were subject to ratification. The Trump administration subsequently disavowed the signature by the United States. However, the remaining 11 signatory countries have since met periodically to consider turning the TPP into an agreement between them, without the United States. Meanwhile, Canada, Mexico and the United States, at the request of the United States, are engaged in a renegotiation of NAFTA. It can be expected that in this process the United States will press for higher levels of IP protection than are currently found in the NAFTA IP chapter.
33
It makes sense for Canada to pursue a new TPP agreement with the remaining 11 TPP countries, regardless of how well the NAFTA renegotiation progresses. On November 17, 2017, the 11 renamed the TPP "the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership" (CPTPP) and "suspended" certain provisions of the earlier TPP.
34 Among these are IP provisions that are potentially of concern to Canada. Significant consequences flow from the difference between the interface of GATT 1994 and GATS, on the one hand, and of TRIPS, on the other, with subsequent bilateral or plurilateral FTAs.
As already mentioned, in respect of GATT 1994 and GATS, WTO members may derogate from their obligations by concluding FTAs (and customs unions), by virtue of GATT article XXIV and GATS article V. That means that more advantageous preferences can be granted by members of a free trade area to each other than are available for the other WTO members under GATT 1994 and GATS. The same is not true regarding TRIPS. TRIPS does not contain such an exception. That means that all IP provisions in new FTAs concluded by Canada and other WTO members are governed by the MFN treatment, contained in TRIPS article 4. Its effect is that IP obligations in FTAs must be extended to all WTO members, subject to four very specific exceptions. This is presumably why Canada, in its CETA implementing legislation, created an open system for new GIs regarding agricultural products and foods and for the new supplementary protection certificates in respect of pharmaceutical patents, from which nationals or businesses from all WTO members can benefit.
The implication of all this also relates to the current debate about the optimal level of IP protection for countries such as Canada in relation to innovation.
35
The current set-up of TRIPS in relation to bilateral IP rules in FTAs makes it very difficult in practice for countries to go back on concessions granted in bilateral agreements because these concessions will have been extended to other WTO members because of the TRIPS MFN obligation. Thus, the international system promotes increasingly higher levels of protection of IP rights, without a country such as Canada realistically being able to consider a reduction of such IP protection. 36 The reason for this conclusion is that reducing the IP protection created by a new FTA would require the termination of that agreement and would also involve reducing the rights of other WTO members. In six of these eight cases (DS50, DS79, DS114, DS170, DS174/290 and DS362), infringements of TRIPS were found in respect of the defending WTO members concerned, i.e., India, Canada, the EC (as it then was) and China, and these findings were subsequently complied with. The defending WTO members notified their compliance to the WTO Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) and these statements of compliance were not contested. However, the other two cases, which both resulted in findings of violations of TRIPS by the United States (the case concerning the "business exemption" in the US The case regarding section 110(5) of the US Copyright Act (DS160) concerned the TRIPSconsistency of two specific exceptions regarding the broadcasting of covered works contained in the US Copyright Act. The first one, contained in section 110(5)(A), which the panel called the "homestyle exemption," allows small restaurants and retail outlets to amplify music broadcasts without an authorization of the right holders and without the payment of a fee, provided that they use only equipment of a kind commonly used in private homes. 40 The second exception, contained in section 110(5)(B), which the panel called the "business exemption," allows the amplification of music broadcasts, without an authorization or payment of a fee, by food service and drinking establishments and by retail establishments, provided that their size does not exceed a certain square footage limit (and by larger establishments, subject to certain equipment limitations). 41 The panel held that the homestyle exemption met the criteria of article 13 of TRIPS but that the business exemption did not. As a consequence, the panel found that the business exemption of the United States had violated articles 11bis and 11 of the Berne Convention (which had become part of TRIPS through TRIPS article 9.1).
Following the adoption of the panel report by the DSB, the United States was granted 12 months (through WTO arbitration) to implement the outcome of the litigation, which period was subsequently extended by the DSB until December 31, 2002, at the request of both parties. The developments since have been unconventional, with an arbitration under article 25 of the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) to determine the level of impairment of benefits caused by the US measure (which fixed the level of "nullification or impairment" at €1,219,900 per year), 42 a request by the EC for the granting ), a suspension of the second set of arbitral proceedings 45 and a period of a "mutually agreed temporary arrangement" (covering the period of June 23, 2003 , through December 20, 2004 , during which the United States compensated the EC by making a lump-sum payment into a fund set up by performing rights societies in the EC to provide general assistance to their members, in accordance with the level of the denial of benefits fixed by the arbitral award of 2001.
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The second outstanding case concerns section 211 of the US Omnibus Appropriations Act of 1988 (DS176). This case is about US countermeasures regarding trademarks, trade names and commercial names that are the same as or substantially similar to trademarks, trade names or commercial names used in connection with businesses or assets confiscated by the Cuban government following the changeover to the Castro regime at the end of 1958. The litigation was really about the sales of rum under the trademark "Havana Club" in the United States. This trademark was confiscated by the government of Cuba and is currently used to sell Cuban rum around the world through a joint venture (Havana Club International) between Pernod Ricard and the Cuban government, except in the United States. In the United States, it is Bacardi that sells its rum under the trademark Havana Club. This split between the US market and the rest of the world in respect of Havana Club is at the root of this dispute.
The WTO panel found violations regarding the trademark part of the US measure under TRIPS articles 3.1, 4 and 42 and Paris Convention article 2(1). This was upheld on appeal. The Appellate Body, reversing the panel, held that these provisions also apply to trade names. The Appellate Body completed the panel's legal analysis regarding trade names and reached the same findings as the panel did in respect of trademarks.
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Despite the "reasonable period of time" for implementation agreed between the EC and the United States, and four extensions, the United States did not implement the outcome of the WTO litigation. The EC did not request retaliation rights against the United States (but the United States waived its legal rights under the DSU to block any possible future request by the EU for retaliation rights as being out of time).
48
In January 2016, the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO), in a surprising decision, allowed the government of Cuba to renew its registration of the Havana Club trademark.
49
This decision of the USPTO has been challenged in the US courts by Bacardi. 50 Regardless of this dispute about trademark rights, any importation into the United States of Cuban Havana Club depends on the lifting of the US trade embargo against Cuban commercial imports. It seems unlikely that this will happen in the near future. Nevertheless, if the litigation in the US courts were to confirm the registration of the Havana Club trademark by the government of Cuba, this would likely constitute compliance in practice with the outcome of the WTO litigation.
These two unresolved WTO cases show that the availability of retaliatory measures for a successful complaining member may not always be enough to secure implementation of the litigation result. Some cases may be too hot politically to be resolved through litigation. Havana Club appeared to be one of those cases. However, there is a possibility that the 2016 decision of the USPTO has created an opening for a solution. It is less clear as to why the case about the business exemption in the US Copyright Act, which appears to be a technical case, has not been resolved. Perhaps the domestic interests of US industry are so strong that correcting legislation is almost impossible to get adopted by the US Congress. Another explanation may be the division of powers under the US Constitution. Because the legislative branch is independent of the executive branch, it becomes necessary in practice for other WTO members not only to interact on trade disputes with the executive branch but also to engage in an intense lobbying effort with the US Congress to have it implement the outcome of WTO litigation that requires repeal of or amendments to US legislation.
51
Regardless of the internal political reasons for non-compliance by the United States in these two cases, there is an obvious irony in the United States monitoring the behaviour of other countries and judging them through the Special 301 process, while at the same time the United States remains delinquent in its compliance with the outcome of these two WTO dispute settlement cases.
Five other important WTO cases have been brought against Australia, alleging WTO-inconsistencies regarding Australia's mandatory plain-packaging measure concerning cigarettes. Ukraine (DS434), Honduras (DS435), the Dominican Republic (DS441), Cuba (DS458) and Indonesia (DS467) are the complainants. These five separate cases are being heard by the same panel. Although the meeting of the parties and the panel took place in the summer of 2016, the reports in these cases have not yet been issued.
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Two investor-state arbitration cases on the same Australian measure, and a similar measure adopted by Uruguay, were brought by Philip Morris against 
Suspension of WTO Members' TRIPS Rights as Part of Retaliation Authorized by the DSB
Another dimension of TRIPS being part of the WTO Agreement is the possibility of IP rights of one WTO member being suspended by another member in a WTO dispute settlement case that is not about TRIPS at all.
From a WTO perspective, retaliation across the three main agreements (GATT 1994, GATS and TRIPS) is logical because these agreements are all integral parts of the WTO Agreement to which the DSU applies. When it comes to retaliation rights, the DSU (in article 22.3) takes the approach of requiring the suspension of concessions or obligations in first instance in the area where violations occurred (usually trade in goods, and less frequently trade in services) and that only in rare cases a crossover to another agreement, such as TRIPS, should be permitted. 55 The possibility of such crossover will most likely be relevant only in disputes where there is a very significant disparity between the economies of two WTO members.
Suspension of TRIPS rights of another WTO member has arisen so far in two arbitrations under DSU article 22.6, in which WTO arbitrators 56 were called upon to quantify the right of a complaining WTO member to suspend concessions or other obligations of another member previously determined to have violated certain WTO obligations. In these cases, the complainants (Ecuador and Antigua, respectively), who had prevailed on the merits, found it necessary to request authorization to suspend IP rights.
The first arbitration arose in EC-Bananas (which concerned trade in goods and services) because of a request by Ecuador for authorization to retaliate against the EC for non-implementation of the outcome of the WTO litigation. 57 As part of determining the quantum of retaliation, the arbitrators were also asked to rule on the WTO-consistency of Ecuador's request for authorization to suspend TRIPS rights of the EC as a potential means of retaliation.
The second case arose in the services area, in United States-Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services, brought by Antigua against the United States. Following the successful challenge by Antigua, Antigua requested WTO retaliation rights, including the suspension of TRIPS rights of the United States. That request by Antigua was referred to arbitration by the United States. The arbitration determined the value of the provision of gambling services blocked by the US measure and also addressed the suspension of TRIPS rights.
In both these awards the arbitrators agreed that Ecuador and Antigua, respectively, were entitled to suspend TRIPS provisions vis-à-vis the EC (as it then was) and the United States. The arbitrators' approval regarding the potential suspension of TRIPS rights was conditional with regard to Ecuador's request (which would only apply if suspension of GATT or GATS obligations could not achieve the 56 DSU article 22.7 makes it clear that the "arbitrator" under article 22.6 can be one or more persons. Since both arbitrations discussed here were carried out by three persons, the term "arbitrators" has been used here, rather than "arbitrator." overall level of retaliation fixed by the arbitrators), but unconditional with regard to Antigua's.
Specifically, the award to Ecuador approved the suspension of TRIPS obligations vis-à-vis the United States (but only if the suspension of GATT or GATS obligations could not achieve the overall level of retaliation of US$201.6 million per year approved by the arbitrators) under article 14 of TRIPS (protection of performers, producers of phonograms [sound recordings] and broadcasting organizations), part II, section 3 (GIs) and section 4 (industrial designs). 58 In the end, Ecuador did not resort to retaliation against the Euopean Union. This case ended in 2012 through notification to the DSB of a mutually agreed solution by the parties.
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Antigua was allowed to suspend TRIPS rights under part II of TRIPS, section 1 (copyright and related rights), section 2 (trademarks), section 4 (industrial designs), section 5 (patents) and section 7 (protection of undisclosed information), to a value not exceeding US$21 million annually. 60 The dispute between Antigua and the United States remains unresolved.
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Cases such as the two outlined here will probably remain rare because usually the suspension of WTO rights in the goods or services sector should provide sufficient inducement toward compliance. The availability of the investor-state dispute settlement mechanism to owners of IP rights is potentially a matter of concern because it offers IP right holders of other states an avenue to challenge administrative decisions and judgments of domestic courts as falling short of the requirements of the investment provisions of an FTA or of the Foreign Investment Protection and Promotion Agreement (FIPA). From the perspective of right holders who are nationals of the defending state party, this can be seen as preferential treatment of foreign right holders and as discrimination by the defending state party against its own nationals. The main current criticisms of the investor-state arbitration mechanism are: the preferential treatment of foreign right holders; and the ad hoc nature of the investor-state arbitration mechanism, which makes the outcome difficult to predict, in particular without an international appeal mechanism.
As the recent arbitration brought by Eli Lilly against Canada under NAFTA Chapter 11 demonstrates, a foreign IP right holder could claim monetary compensation for losing a patent by alleging that the court's decision to invalidate the patent constituted a measure tantamount to expropriation without compensation, 62 or failed to meet the minimum standard of treatment required under international investment law.
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Canada's FTAs and FIPAs generally contain a provision that would bar a finding of expropriation without adequate compensation if IP rights were lost or impaired due to a measure that (in the case of an FTA) was in conformity with the IP chapter of the FTA or (in the case of a FIPA) was in conformity with TRIPS. This makes sense because foreign investors should not be able to challenge IP measures of the host country that are in conformity with the IP chapter of the FTA concerned (if one was included) or with TRIPS in case of a FIPA. While it makes good sense to have such an exception in the FTA or FIPA, it should also be appreciated that arbitrators judging an investor-state case may wish to avoid the application of the exception because administrative or court decisions invalidating IP rights will not automatically amount to "expropriation." In the Eli Lilly arbitration, the arbitrators dismissed the investor's claims but saw no need to resort to the exception. They decided that the court decisions invalidating the two patents concerned did not amount to expropriation because there was no "sudden and dramatic change" in the courts' interpretation of Canada's patent law; the exception thus became irrelevant in deciding the case.
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The formula used to capture the exception of IP measures that are in conformity with the IP chapter of the FTA concerned or with TRIPS has varied somewhat in different agreements.
One example of such a provision is article 1110(7) of NAFTA: "This Article does not apply to the issuance of compulsory licenses granted in relation to intellectual property rights, or to the revocation, limitation or creation of intellectual property rights, to the extent that such issuance, revocation, limitation or creation is consistent with Chapter Seventeen (Intellectual Property)."
65
The Canada-Chile FTA, in article G-10, paragraph 7, provides: "This Article does not apply to the issuance of compulsory licences granted in relation to intellectual property rights, or to the revocation, limitation or creation of intellectual property rights, to the extent that such issuance, revocation, limitation or creation is consistent with the TRIPS Agreement." The Canada-Mali FIPA, in article 10(5) (on expropriation), follows the standard FIPA formula, which provides: "This Article does not apply to the issuance of compulsory licenses granted in relation to intellectual property rights, or to the revocation, limitation, or creation of intellectual property rights, to the extent that the issuance, revocation, limitation, or creation is consistent with the WTO Agreement." 67 The rationale of this provision appears to be the same as for the provision cited above from the Canada-Chile FTA, i.e., that the FIPA does not contain substantive provisions on IP.
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The Canada-China FIPA, in article 10 (2) This provision is a broader exception than the previous ones, which are limited to compulsory licences or to the revocation, limitation or creation of IP rights. The reference to "other measures in respect of IPRs" broadens the scope of the exception. The exception is also broadened because the justification of the measure concerned may be based on any international agreement regarding IP to which both parties to the FIPA are party. 70 While paragraph 5 is limited to the consistency of compulsory licences with TRIPS, paragraph 6 (which is "[f]or greater certainty") is concerned with "the revocation, limitation or creation of intellectual property rights" and excludes these from expropriation to the extent that consistency with TRIPS or the CETA IP chapter can be demonstrated. Obviously, paragraph 6 (despite being for greater certainty) is significantly broader than paragraph 5.
The provisions cited above are important in that they exclude from the scope of the expropriation articles of FTAs and FIPAs measures that are consistent with the IP rules cited in these provisions. In fact, it is significant that the arbitral tribunal in Eli Lilly v Canada never addressed whether the invalidation of Eli Lilly's two patents was consistent with NAFTA Chapter 17 (on IP). In the eyes of the tribunal, there was no need to address this issue because a domestic court exercising its judicial function with no irregularity could not possibly be engaged in a measure tantamount to expropriation. The arbitral tribunal thus was wise not even to address NAFTA article 1110(7). However, this does not undermine the utility of having the exception discussed above included in Canada's FTAs and FIPAs.
Broader issues are still outstanding in respect of the investor-state dispute settlement system. The system has come under considerable criticism, especially within the EU because it provides a privileged status for foreign investors and because of the ad hoc nature of the arbitration process (usually three arbitrators, consisting of one arbitrator appointed by each party, and the third arbitrator appointed by agreement of both parties or in accordance with a procedure agreed to by them).
While the privileged status of the foreign investor is an inherent feature of investor-state arbitration, questions of transparency of the procedural process and the consistency of arbitral decision making are issues beginning to be addressed. In fact, that was the underlying thinking that resulted in the investment court system included in chapter 8 (investment) of the Canada-EU CETA, consisting of a tribunal and an appellate tribunal.
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CETA also foresees the possibility of the establishment of a multilateral investment tribunal and an appellate mechanism that might take over from the CETA Tribunal and Appellate Tribunal.
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The investor-state arbitration mechanisms were excluded from the current provisional application of CETA. The CETA Appellate Tribunal was added to the CETA text very late, after the actual negotiations had been completed. The CETA text of article 8.28 left the organization of the Appellate Tribunal to the CETA Joint Committee. This means there will be a further negotiation between Canada and the European Union in due course on the composition and operation of the Appellate Tribunal. While these new provisions go in the right direction to counter some criticisms of the investor-state arbitration mechanism, it remains to be seen how the CETA investment court system will operate in the future (after CETA enters into force definitively, after it has been ratified by all the member states of the European Union). It also remains to be seen whether a multilateral investment tribunal and appellate mechanism will in fact be established and whether that will satisfy the critics of investor-state arbitration. While the United States and the European Union have tried to achieve TRIPS-plus IP standards through bilateral FTAs, the international community, through WIPO, has made continuing efforts to improve the international IP rules through the preparation and elaboration of new international IP treaties. A good example is the WIPO Internet Treaties of 1996. These treaties are generally considered important new agreements in the copyright area (the compliance with which is required by CETA and the accession to which was required by the text of the TPP as it was signed in 2016). The WIPO Internet Treaties are probably of a stature that would warrant their integration into TRIPS as the global IP treaty of the WTO.
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This has not happened. Including references to these treaties in TRIPS, which would achieve incorporation by reference of their provisions into TRIPS, would require an amendment to TRIPS, which is not an easy thing to achieve. The adoption of such an amendment through the WTO Ministerial Conference or the General Council would probably require consensus, which means that any WTO member could block the adoption. 74 Also, bringing the text of such an amendment into force will probably take a long time.
The only amendment to date to TRIPS adopted by the General Council of the WTO pursuant to article X.1 and article IV.2 (on access to medicines) of the WTO Agreement dates back to 2005. 75 It took more than 11 years for the amendment to enter into force, on January 23, 2017, after two-thirds of the WTO members had filed their acceptances 73 It is doubtful that any of the WIPO treaties adopted since 1996 are of the same stature. 
Conclusion
Integrating international IP rules into TRIPS and the simultaneous subjection of TRIPS to WTO dispute settlement has probably been the most important change in the international IP system since the mid1970s. 77 This change resulted from a constellation of developments in the late 1980s and early 1990s. It resulted from a gradual evolution of the thinking about a new international set of rules and dispute settlement mechanism regarding IP rules, first in the Tokyo Round and later in the Uruguay Round. The current enforceability of TRIPS through WTO dispute settlement has unquestionably strengthened the position of global IP rules. The same can be said of new TRIPS-plus rules included in more recent FTAs (since the establishment of the WTO) and subjected to the dispute settlement rules of these FTAs.
While the possibility of retaliation under the WTO Agreement is useful because it makes compliance with the outcome of WTO litigation more likely, the limited experience with the WTO dispute settlement in respect of TRIPS rules also shows that retaliation is not a panacea that ensures compliance in all cases. There is irony in the fact that in the two WTO dispute settlement cases that did not result in compliance with the outcome, the United States was the respondent. The United States was the most significant proponent of stronger IP rules (through TRIPS) in the WTO Agreement and continues to assess the measures of other countries and exert pressure on them through its unilateral mechanism of Special 301.
There is an interaction between TRIPS and subsequent FTAs containing TRIPS-plus provisions, which may not be fully appreciated. TRIPS, unlike the other foundational agreements of the WTO, contains no exception for FTAs allowing two or more WTO members to grant higher levels of IP protection vis-à-vis each other as compared to other WTO members. The effect of a strong MFN provision in TRIPS and the absence of an exception for FTAs is that new IP obligations in FTAs must be extended to all WTO members, subject to four very specific exceptions stated in article 4. This makes it very difficult for countries that import significant quantities of IP from abroad, such as Canada, to establish an IP and innovation policy for the future.
This also makes it very difficult, in practice, for countries such as Canada to rescind TRIPS-plus provisions granted in earlier bilateral agreements. The reason is that these IP provisions are embedded in FTAs and are therefore part of a broader package of trade-related provisions, which Canada is unlikely to want to reject totally. Further, the IP concessions of previous FTAs will already have been extended to other WTO members because of the TRIPS MFN obligation. Thus, the international system promotes increasingly higher levels of protection of IP rights that countries such as Canada cannot, in practice, reverse. This raises serious questions, especially at a time in which NAFTA is being renegotiated and some are questioning whether Canada has gone too far in setting levels of IP rights protection that may be at odds with its economic interests and desire to promote an innovation economy.
The relationship between investor-state arbitration (under FTAs or FIPAs), on the one hand, and the decisions of domestic courts on IP, on the other, remains a matter of concern for the future. Up to now, the arbitral tribunals dealing with investorstate arbitration have been sufficiently deferential to avoid conflicts. One way of avoiding this concern altogether would be to exclude IP from the scope of investments covered by the investorstate arbitration mechanism. Since that appears unlikely to be politically acceptable for those countries that are significant exporters of IP, one should encourage the current development of new mechanisms that aim to ensure greater consistency in the jurisprudence of arbitral tribunals, i.e., by making the arbitral tribunals more permanent in nature and by creating an appeal mechanism.
Finally, it will be important for the international IP system that the substance of new and important international IP rules (to be generated by WIPO or other sources from time to time) be integrated into TRIPS by way of future amendments. If not, TRIPS will become a document that is out of date, which may not be worth relying on in WTO dispute settlement. Without periodic amendments of the TRIPS text, WTO members may instead increasingly rely on the bilateral or plurilateral FTAs with TRIPS-plus provisions, rather than the TRIPS text, thereby eroding the most significant development in international IP law of the last 25 years. CIGI Press books are distributed by McGill-Queen's University Press (mqup.ca) and can be found in better bookstores and through online book retailers.
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